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  1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 The Cato Institute was established in 1977 as a nonpartisan public policy 
research foundation dedicated to advancing the principles of individual liberty, free 
markets, and limited government.  Cato’s Center for Constitutional Studies was 
established in 1989 to promote the principles of limited constitutional government 
that are the foundation of liberty.  Toward those ends, Cato publishes books and 
studies, conducts conferences, and publishes the annual Cato Supreme Court 
Review.  It also files amicus briefs with the courts, including in cases focusing on 
the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause such as United States 
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), and 
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).  The present case centrally 
concerns Cato because it represents the federal government’s most egregious 
attempt to exceed its constitutional powers. 
The Competitive Enterprise Institute is a public interest group founded in 
1984 and dedicated to free enterprise, limited government, and civil liberties.  It 
studies and publishes on a wide range of regulatory issues, including those 
involving health and safety, drugs, biotechnology, and medical innovation—as 
well as the regulation of insurance markets.  CEI attorneys have argued or 
participated as amicus curiae in numerous constitutional cases before the Supreme 
                                                 
1 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29, both parties, through their respective counsel, 
have consented to the filing of this brief. 
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Court and other federal courts.  Senior Attorney Hans Bader was also co-counsel in 
Morrison, the last Supreme Court decision to strike down a law as beyond 
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers. 
 Randy E. Barnett is the Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory at 
the Georgetown University Law Center.  Prof. Barnett has taught constitutional 
law, contracts, and criminal law, among other subjects, and has published more 
than 100 articles and reviews, as well as nine books.  His book, Restoring the Lost 
Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (Princeton, 2004), and other scholarship 
concerns the original meaning of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses 
and their relationship to the powers enumerated in the Constitution.  His 
constitutional law casebook, Constitutional Law: Cases in Context (Aspen 2008), 
is widely used in law schools throughout the country.  In 2004 he argued Gonzales 
v. Raich in the Supreme Court.  In 2008, he was awarded a Guggenheim 
Fellowship in Constitutional Studies. 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The individual mandate goes beyond Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce under existing doctrine.  The outermost bounds of the Supreme Court’s 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence—the “substantial effects doctrine”—prevent 
Congress from reaching intrastate non-economic activity regardless of whether it 
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substantially affects interstate commerce.  Nor under existing law can Congress 
reach inactivity even if it purports to act pursuant to a broader regulatory scheme. 
The Constitution does not permit Congress to conscript citizens into 
economic transactions in order to remedy the admitted shortcomings (which the 
Secretary usually terms “necessities”) of a hastily assembled piece of legislation. 
Although the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to execute its 
regulatory authority over interstate commerce, it is not a blank check permitting 
Congress to ignore constitutional limits by manufacturing necessities.  “Salutatory 
goals and creative drafting have never been sufficient to offset an absence of 
enumerated powers.”  Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 780 (E.D. Va. 
2010).  The individual health insurance mandate is not constitutionally warranted 
because it is “necessary” to make PPACA function properly.2  Indeed, any law—
“necessary” or otherwise—that purports to compel otherwise inactive citizens to 
engage in economic activity is unconstitutional.   
While the Secretary emphasizes the “uniqueness” of the health care system 
and the wisdom of the legislation at issue, “this case is not about whether the Act is 
wise or unwise legislation…in fact, it is not really about our health care system at 
all.  It is principally about our federalist system, and it raises very important issues 
regarding the Constitutional role of the federal government.”  Florida v. United 
                                                 
2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 
1501(a)(1)-(2), 124 Stat. 119 (2010).   
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States Dept. of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8822, at *6 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).   
Moreover, what Congress is attempting to do here is quite literally 
unprecedented.  As a district court ruling for the federal government recognized, 
“in every Commerce Clause case presented thus far, there has been some sort of 
activity.  In this regard, the Health Care Reform Act arguably presents an issue of 
first impression.”  Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp.2d 882, 893 
(E.D. Mich. 2010).   Or, as another district court upholding the mandate conceded: 
“As previous Commerce Clause cases have all involved physical activity, as 
opposed to mental activity, i.e. decision-making, there is little judicial guidance on 
whether the latter falls within Congress’s power.”  Mead v. Holder, No. 10-950 
(GK),  2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592, at *55 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011) 
The Congressional Budget Office agrees: “The government has never 
required people to buy any good or service as a condition of lawful residence in the 
United States.”  Cong. Budget Office, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual 
Mandate to Buy Health Insurance 1 (1994).  Nor has the government ever said that 
every man and woman faces a civil penalty for declining to participate in the 
marketplace.  And never before have courts had to consider such a breathtaking 
assertion of raw power under the Commerce Clause.  Even in Wickard v. Filburn, 
317 U.S. 11 (1942), the federal government claimed “merely” the power to 
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regulate what farmers grew, not to mandate that people become farmers, much less 
to force people to purchase farm products.  Even if not purchasing health insurance 
is considered an “economic activity”—which of course would mean that every 
aspect of human life is economic activity—there is no legal basis for Congress to 
require individuals to enter the marketplace to buy a particular good or service. 
Amici offer this brief to highlight that, although the “substantial effects 
doctrine” is sometimes conceived as a “Commerce Clause” doctrine, it is actually 
based on the Necessary and Proper Clause in the context of the power to regulate 
interstate commerce.  Consequently, the limitations of this doctrine mark the 
existing doctrinal limit on the constitutional requirement that a law be “necessary” 
to the execution of the commerce power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
Because economic mandates do not fall under this existing doctrine that governs 
necessity, it is unconstitutional to impose economic mandates on the people under 
the guise of regulating commerce.   
Even if economic mandates are deemed “necessary,” however, they fail 
constitutional muster because they are not a “proper” means of executing an 
enumerated power.     
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Mandate is Unconstitutional Under the “Substantial Effects” 
Doctrine That Defines the Scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
in the Context of the Commerce Power 
 
A. The “Substantial Effects” Doctrine Interprets the Necessary and 
Proper Clause in the Commerce Clause Context to Allow 
Congress to Exercise Its Regulatory Authority While Cabining 
That Authority 
 
  Since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has asked whether a particular 
“economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce” when considering 
whether it falls under Congress’s Commerce Clause power.  Gonzalez v. Raich, 
545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 
(2000) (in turn quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995)).  The 
New Deal cases in which the “substantial effects doctrine” was first developed, 
however, found the authority for it not in the Commerce Clause itself but in its 
execution via the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Although prevailing legal 
convention describes the New Deal cases as expanding the definition of 
“commerce,” a closer examination of these decisions shows that the definition of 
“commerce” remained unchanged.  The Court instead asked whether federal 
regulation of the activity in question is a necessary and proper means for exercising 
the power to regulate interstate commerce because the activity substantially affects 
that commerce.  Beyond that point Congress has never been able go. 
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  In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), for example, the Court 
considered the power of Congress to “prohibit the employment of workmen in the 
production of goods ‘for interstate commerce’ at other than prescribed wages and 
hours.”  Id. at 105.  Rather than stretching the definition of “commerce,” the Court 
focused on how congressional power “extends to those activities intrastate which 
so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to 
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, 
the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.”  
Id.  The authority cited for this proposition did not come from Gibbons v. Ogden, 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)—the Commerce Clause case that the Court had 
already cited throughout its opinion—but instead from the foundational Necessary 
and Proper Clause case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
  A year after Darby, in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Court 
employed the same reasoning—that “commerce” was not being redefined but 
rather the challenged measures were a necessary and proper means for regulating 
commerce as historically understood.  Like Darby, Wickard is explicit in its 
reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause, citing McCulloch, id. at 130, n.29, as 
authority for congressional power—even if Roscoe Filburn’s personal production 
of wheat “may not be regarded as commerce.”  Id. at 125.  Thus, contrary to the 
conventional academic view, Wickard did not expand the Commerce Clause to 
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include the power to regulate intrastate activity that, when aggregated, 
substantially affects interstate commerce.  Instead, “like Darby, Wickard is both a 
Commerce Clause and a Necessary and Proper Clause case[,]” with the substantial 
effects doctrine reaching Roscoe Filburn’s wheat growing via the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual 
Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L.L. 581, 594 (2011). 
 Fast forward 50 years, when the Court clarified the substantial effects 
doctrine by confining congressional power under the Commerce and Necessary 
and Proper Clauses to the regulation of intrastate economic activity.  Again, as in 
Wickard and Darby, the Court did not redefine “commerce” but only refined its 
analysis of whether the means adopted by Congress were necessary and proper to 
the end of regulating commerce. 
 In United States v. Lopez, the Court found that “[e]ven Wickard, which is 
perhaps the most far-reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over 
intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that possession of a gun in 
a school zone does not.”  514 U.S. at 560.  Five years later, in United States v. 
Morrison, the Court held that the gender-motivated violence regulated by the 
Violence Against Women Act was not itself economic activity and thus had only 
an “indirect and remote” or “attenuated” effect on interstate commerce.  529 U.S. 
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at 608 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57 (in turn quoting NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937))), 615.   
  Chief Justice Rehnquist described the limits of Congress’s power as follows: 
“Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation 
regulating that activity will be sustained.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (emphasis 
added).  Conversely, non-economic activity cannot be regulated merely because it 
has “substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption,” or 
affects interstate commerce through a “but-for causal chain.”  Morrison, 529 U.S. 
at 615.  Instead, the subject of regulation must have a “close” qualitative “relation 
to interstate commerce,” not merely a substantial “quantitative” impact on the 
national economy.  NLRB, 301 U.S. at 37; Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute, 169 F.3d 820, 843 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), aff’d sub nom United States 
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
  Adopting the distinction between economic and non-economic activity 
allowed the Court to determine when it was truly necessary to regulate intrastate 
commerce without involving it in protracted, and arguably impossible, attempts to 
evaluate the “more or less necessity or utility” of a measure.  Alexander Hamilton, 
Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (February 23, 1791), in 
Legislative and Documentary History of the Bank of the United States 98 (H. St. 
Clair & D.A. Hall eds., reprinted Augustus M. Kelley 1967) (1832).  This 
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Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine limits congressional power to regulating 
intrastate economic activity because this category of activity is closely connected 
to interstate commerce, and limiting the scope of “necessary” in this way avoids 
implying a power tantamount to a federal police power that the Supreme Court has 
always denied existed.  See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.  Moreover, a power to 
regulate intrastate economic activity that has a substantial affect on interstate 
commerce is not so broad as to obstruct or supplant the states’ police powers.   
  In other words, to preserve the constitutional scheme of limited and 
enumerated powers, the Court drew a judicially administrable line beyond which 
Congress could not go in enacting “necessary” means to execute its power to 
regulate interstate commerce.  The “substantial effects” doctrine, as limited in 
Lopez and Morrison, thus established the outer doctrinal bounds of “necessity” 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
  As Professor Randy Beck has explained, “[g]iven the close relationship 
between intrastate and interstate economic activity, a statute regulating local 
economic conduct will usually be calculated to accomplish an end legitimately 
encompassed within the plenary congressional authority over interstate 
commerce.”  J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 581, 625 (2002).  In short, regulating intrastate 
economic activity can be a “necessary” means of regulating interstate commerce as 
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that term is understood under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  The obvious 
corollary is that regulating non-economic activity cannot be “necessary,” 
regardless of its effect on interstate commerce.  And a power to regulate inactivity 
is even more remote from Congress’s power over interstate commerce. 
Most recently, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court found the cultivation of 
marijuana to be an economic activity that Congress could prohibit as a necessary 
and proper exercise of its commerce power.  545 U.S. at 22.  Raich explicitly 
adhered to the economic/non-economic distinction set out in Lopez and Morrison.  
As Justice Stevens wrote for the majority, “Our case law firmly establishes 
Congress’s power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic 
‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”  Id. at 17 
(emphasis added).   The majority in Raich, therefore, reaffirmed that Congress’s 
ability to execute its commerce power through the “necessary” prong of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause reaches only economic activity. 
Raich also rejected the government’s contention that it was Angel Raich’s or 
Roscoe Filburn’s non-purchase of a commodity traded interstate that brought their 
personal cultivation under congressional power.  See Barnett, supra, at 602-03.  
Instead, Justice Stevens invoked the Webster’s Dictionary definition of 
“economics”—“the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities,” 
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Raich, 545 U.S. at 25—and thus refused to adopt the government’s sweeping 
theory here that non-participation in the marketplace was itself economic activity. 
B. Regulating Inactivity Transcends the Necessary and Proper Clause’s 
Limits to the Commerce Clause 
 
Just as Chief Justice Rehnquist in Lopez surveyed all previous substantial 
effects cases to discern the line between economic and non-economic activity, if 
this court examines existing case law it will see that in none of them did Congress 
seek to regulate inactivity. 
In Wickard, Roscoe Filburn was in the business of growing wheat and thus 
voluntarily engaged in economic activity.  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114-15.  In NLRB, 
the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation was subject to regulatory schemes because 
it voluntarily engaged in the economic activity of steelmaking.  NLRB, 301 U.S. at 
26.  The Civil Rights Cases concerned parties that voluntarily chose to engage in 
the economic activity of operating a restaurant and a hotel, respectively.  
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964).  And finally, in Raich, Diane Monson and 
Angel Raich grew, processed, and consumed medicinal marijuana—all voluntary 
activities.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 7. 
All these cases fall into two general categories.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 35-38 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the “two general circumstances” in which “the 
regulation of intrastate activities may be necessary to and proper for the regulation 
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of interstate commerce”—and limits thereto).  First, if persons voluntarily engage 
in economic activity, for example by starting a business or participating in 
agriculture, manufacturing, or another commercial endeavor, Congress can 
regulate the manner by which their activities are conducted as a necessary and 
proper exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce.  Such regulation of 
voluntary economic activity may include mandates—for example, to meet 
recordkeeping requirements or post workplace regulations.  But this doctrine has 
never included compelling persons to engage in the economic activity itself, for 
example, by starting the business or by buying a product.   
The second category, exemplified by Raich, concerns Congress’s power to 
prohibit altogether a particular type of commerce, such as that involving drugs.  
Beginning with the lottery case, Champion v. Anderson, 188 U.S. 321 (1903), the 
Court recognized that the commerce power included the power to prohibit an 
activity.  In Raich, the Court found that Congress may prohibit wholly intrastate 
instances of an activity as a “necessary” means of prohibiting interstate commerce.   
Under either theory, however, although Congress can regulate or even 
prohibit voluntary economic actions that substantially affect interstate commerce, 
it cannot force people to undertake such actions—even if such actions, when 
voluntarily undertaken, would have been subject to regulation or prohibition. 
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With the individual mandate, Congress implicitly acknowledged the 
requirement that Congress be regulating “activity,” by redefining the word 
“activity” to include the activity of making a “decision,” including a decision not 
to act.  If this argument is accepted, however, the traditional distinction between 
acts and omissions would collapse.  If a “decision” not to act is an act, then 
inactivity would be transformed into activity by linguistic alchemy.   
Similarly, if inaction is deemed to be “economic” because of its economic 
effects, then the distinction between economic and non-economic activity 
established in Lopez and reaffirmed in Morrison and Raich would also collapse.  
Indeed, Lopez and Morrison stand for the proposition Congress may not regulate 
such intrastate non-economic activities as gun possession and gender-motivated 
violence, notwithstanding a showing that in the aggregate this non-economic 
activity had substantial economic effects on interstate commerce.  Since any class 
of activity (or inactivity), in the aggregate, can be said to have an economic effect, 
the line the Court drew between intrastate economic activity that Congress may 
reach and the intrastate non-economic activity which is outside its powers would 
be destroyed.  A lower court has no authority to thwart existing Supreme Court 
doctrine governing the scope of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause 
in this way. 
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II. The Individual Mandate Cannot be Justified as an “Essential Part of 
a Broader Regulatory Scheme” because Congress Cannot Regulate 
Inactivity 
 
Unable to directly justify the individual mandate under existing Commerce 
Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine (let alone the fallback taxing 
power theories that we do not discuss here), the government has resorted to a new 
theory: that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to mandate 
economic activity when doing so is an essential part of a broader regulatory 
scheme.  That is, while not itself a regulation of interstate commerce, nor a 
regulation of intrastate economic activity, nor even a regulation of intrastate non-
economic activity, an economic mandate is a necessary and proper means of 
exercising the lawful ends of regulating the interstate health insurance industry.   
The government’s proposed theory that Congress may mandate economic 
activity rests on a sentence from Lopez and a concurring opinion by Justice Scalia 
in Raich that identify circumstances when Congress may reach wholly intrastate 
non-economic activity.  In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia affirmed our view 
that the substantial effects doctrine is a product of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  “Our cases show that the regulation of intrastate activities may be 
necessary to and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce in two general 
circumstances.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., concurring).  The first of these 
circumstances included the substantial effects doctrine, which he said is limited to 
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reaching intrastate economic activity.  He then identified a second Necessary and 
Proper Clause doctrine by which “Congress may regulate even non-economic local 
activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of 
interstate commerce.” Id. at 37.   
If the Supreme Court decides to employ this theory for the first time, it will 
still need to identify a limiting principle, lest it leave Congress with a general 
police power, which is forbidden to it.  See Morrison, 529 U.S.  at 618-19 (quoting 
Lopez, 514 U. S. at 566 (“The Constitution ... withhold[s] from Congress a plenary 
police power”); and id. at 584-585 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[W]e always have 
rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that 
would permit Congress to exercise a police power”).  The distinction between 
economic and non-economic activity would obviously provide no limit to this 
doctrine.  The whole purpose for Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion was to 
question the usefulness of that distinction in dealing with the problems posed by 
Raich.  The most obvious line to draw is that between regulating activity—whether 
economic or non-economic—and inactivity.     
In Lopez, the Court discussed reaching intrastate non-economic activity 
when doing so is “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in 
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated.”  514 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added).  In Raich, Justice Scalia proposed 
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that “Congress may regulate even non-economic local activity if that regulation is a 
necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.” 545 U.S. at 37 
(emphasis added).  Indeed, in his Raich opinion, Justice Scalia uses the word 
“activity” or “activities” 42 times.  See Jason Mazzone, Can Congress Force You 
to Be Healthy? N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2010, at A39.  There is good reason to doubt 
that Justice Scalia would ever extend his proposed doctrine to reach inactivity.  
Scalia, after all, is the Justice who referred to the Necessary and Proper Clause as 
“the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action.”  Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997) (Scalia, J.), a proposition he recently 
reaffirmed.  See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1983 (2010) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting, joined in part by Scalia, J.). 
The distinction between activity and inactivity provides the same type of 
judicially administrable limiting doctrine for what is “necessary” to execute the 
commerce power under an “essential to a broader regulatory scheme” theory as the 
economic/non-economic distinction provides for the substantial effects doctrine. 
Now that Congress has, for the first time, sought to reach inactivity, all the 
Supreme Court need do is look back at its previous substantial effects doctrine 
cases, as it did in Lopez, to see that every case decided until now involved the 
regulation of activity, not inactivity.  As the district court said while striking down 
the individual mandate here, “[e]very application of Commerce Clause power 
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found to be constitutionally sound by the Supreme Court involved some sort of 
action, transaction, or deed placed in motion by an individual or legal entity.” 
Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 781. 
  Limiting Congress to regulating or prohibiting activity under both the 
“substantial effects” and the “essential to a broader regulatory scheme” doctrines 
would serve the same purpose as the economic/non-economic distinction.  Such a 
formal limitation would help assure that exercises of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to execute the commerce power would be truly incidental to that power and 
not remote.  Doing nothing at all involves not entering into a literally infinite set of 
economic transactions.  Giving Congress discretionary power to pass broad 
regulatory schemes involving this infinite set of inactions would amount to 
granting a plenary and unlimited police power over inactions that are remote from 
interstate commerce.  However imperfect, some such line must be drawn to 
preserve Article I’s structure of limited and enumerated powers. See Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Although the resolution of specific cases 
has proved difficult, we have derived from the Constitution workable standards to 
assist in preserving separation of powers and checks and balances.”). Because 
accepting the government’s theory in this case would effectively demolish that 
structure, the government’s theory is constitutionally unsatisfying. 
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  To date, the government has offered no constitutional limiting principle on 
its asserted power to regulate when doing so is essential to a broader regulatory 
scheme.  In place of any constitutional limitation, the government attempts to 
distinguish the health insurance business as “unique” in various respects.  Defs.’ 
Response to Pls’. Mot. Prelim. Inj.  and Br. Supp. at 24 n.10, Thomas More Law 
Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp.2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 10-11156); Defs.’ 
Reply to Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. and Br. Supp. at 11-12, Thomas More Law Center 
v. Obama, 720 F. Supp.2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 10-11156).  But examining 
the “uniqueness” of the market being regulated and the problems Congress chose 
to ameliorate is precisely the sort of inquiry into the “more or less necessity” of a 
measure that has been rejected by the Supreme Court since McCulloch.   
In the course of pointing to one particular “unique” aspect of health care, the 
Secretary claims that the individual mandate is no different than requiring advance 
purchase of health care.  Nearly everyone ultimately consumes health care; and 
consumption is clearly an economic act.  Brief for Appellant at 17, Commonwealth 
ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No. 11-1057 & 11-1058 (4th Cir. Feb. 28, 2011).  
Why then, so the argument goes, wouldn’t the Commerce Clause allow the federal 
government to direct that health care be purchased now, by obtaining insurance, 
rather than later when the medical bill comes due?  Id. at 18-19.  In other words, 
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buying health insurance is just a timing decision about when, not whether, to incur 
medical costs. Id. at 7, 19-20. 
Yet rather than provide a constitutional limit on the power to impose 
economic mandates, the government’s argument invites a judicial examination of 
the “more or less necessity” of congressional action. Virtually all forms of 
insurance represent timing decisions—paying up front for burial costs, loss of life, 
disability, supplemental income, credit default, business interruption, and more.  
See Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *100-01 (discussing cost-shifting and 
timing decisions in all insurance markets). Only a federal government of 
unbounded powers could mandate that every American insure against such risks.  
And “[t]here will be no stopping point if that should be deemed the equivalent of 
activity for Commerce Clause purposes.”  Id. at *102.  And while it might be 
permissible to penalize an uninsured person who shows up at a hospital or doctor’s 
office demanding that his expenses be borne by the taxpayers, that is not what 
PPACA does.  Instead, PPACA penalizes all uninsured persons, not just those who 
seek to be reimbursed by government for costs they should have borne themselves. 
Id. at *72 n.14.  And PPACA does more than mandate coverage; it also prescribes 
certain provisions that each policy must include.  Many Americans who prefer to 
insure using, for example, Health Savings Accounts with high deductible coverage, 
will be told by their federal overseers that such coverage isn’t adequate.  Id. 
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The Supreme Court’s repeatedly affirmed requirement that there be a 
constitutional limit on federal power cannot be side stepped by invoking the 
admitted importance of reforming health care or the cost-shifting aspects of that 
market.  Because the courts will defer to Congress’s assessment of the rationality 
of addressing problems in the health care market, the retort that “health care is 
different” provides no judicially administrable limit on the new power to impose 
economic mandates on the people.  By claiming that “health care is special” and 
that the unique features of the health care market and existing government 
regulations justify the individual mandate, the government asks courts to weigh the 
“more or less necessity or utility” of the new health care law.  In doing so, it 
ignores the unprecedented nature of the individual mandate and, instead, offers a 
long-discarded method of constitutional interpretation.  
Striking down the individual mandate requires no such tortuous calculations, 
and it would affect no other law ever enacted by Congress. “[T]he task is to 
identify a mode of analysis that allows Congress to regulate more than nothing (by 
declining to reduce each case to its litigants) and less than everything (by declining 
to let Congress set the terms of analysis).”  Raich, 545 U.S at 47-48 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting).  And Congress could have reformed the health care system in any 
number of ways that may have been better or worse as a matter of policy—
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including the adoption of a Medicare-for-Everyone “single payer” scheme—that 
would have been legally unassailable. 
 
III. The Individual Mandate Constitutes a “Commandeering of the 
People” That Is Not “Proper” Under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause 
 
The Supreme Court, in two cases presenting then-unprecedented assertions 
of power under the Commerce Clause, stated that Congress cannot use this power 
to mandate or “commandeer” state legislatures and executive officers.  Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992).  As Justice Scalia explained, doing so would be “fundamentally 
incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty,” and therefore 
improper under our federalist system. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.  In Printz, Justice 
Scalia pointed to the Tenth Amendment as the source of “residual state 
sovereignty” in a constitutional system that confers upon Congress “not all 
governmental powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones.”  Id. at 919 (citing U.S. 
Const. amend. X).  He then elaborated that the mandate at issue, even if necessary, 
could not be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause:  “When a 
‘la[w]…for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the principle 
of state sovereignty reflected in” the Tenth Amendment and other constitutional 
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provisions, “it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into execution the Commerce 
Clause.’” Id. at 923-24 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18) (emphasis added). 
Just as mandating that states take action is improper commandeering, so too 
is mandating that individual citizens enter into transactions with private companies 
an improper commandeering of the people.  See generally, Barnett, supra, at 621-
34.  The Tenth Amendment reads:  “The powers not delegated by the Constitution 
to the United States, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states 
respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. Const. amend. X (emphasis added).  In this 
way, the text of the Tenth Amendment protects not just state sovereignty, but also 
popular sovereignty.   
Chief Justice John Jay affirmed the priority of popular sovereignty in the 
first great constitutional case before the Supreme Court, Chisholm v. Georgia, 
noting that the “sovereignty of the nation is in the people of the nation, and the 
residuary sovereignty of each State in the people of each state,” as the people were 
“truly the sovereigns of the country.”  2 U.S. (Dall.) 419, 471-72 (1793).  Fellow 
Founder James Wilson agreed, recognizing that sovereignty starts with the 
individual citizen:  “If one free man, an original sovereign, may do all this; why 
may not an aggregate of free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do this 
likewise?”  Id. at 456 (emphasis added).  Although the Eleventh Amendment 
reversed the outcome of Chisholm and the Supreme Court has interpreted that 
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Amendment as establishing state sovereignty, the Court has never repudiated the 
priority of popular sovereignty.  See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) 
(“in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of 
government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all 
government exists and acts.”). 
Just as the Constitution disallows the “commandeering” of states as a means 
of regulating interstate commerce, so too does it bar a “commandeering of the 
people” for this purpose.  Various express provisions of the Constitution reflect 
this anti-commandeering principle.  For example, persons may not be mandated to 
quarter soldiers in their homes in time of peace, U.S. Const. amend. III, to testify 
against themselves, id., amend. V, or to labor for another, id., amend. XIII.   
What very few mandates are imposed on the people by the federal 
government all rest on the fundamental pre-existing duties that citizens owe that 
government.  Such are the duties to register for the draft and serve in the armed 
forces if called, to sit on a federal jury, and to file a tax return.  See, e.g., Selective 
Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918) (relying on the “supreme and noble 
duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation” to reject a 
claim founded on the Thirteenth Amendment).  In the United States, there is not 
even a duty to vote.  So there is certainly no comparable pre-existing “supreme and 
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noble duty” to engage in economic activity when doing so is convenient to the 
congressional regulation of interstate commerce.   
There are also pragmatic reasons to believe that the individual mandate is 
not “proper.”  In New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor explained that 
mandates on states are improper because, “where the Federal Government directs  
the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public 
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may 
remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”  505 U.S. 144, 
169 (1992).  That proposition applies to the commandeering of individuals as well: 
the individual mandate has allowed Congress and the president to escape political 
accountability for increasing taxes on persons making less than $250,000 per year 
by compelling them to make payments directly to private companies.  It is the 
evasion of that accountability that explains why the mandate was formulated as a 
regulatory “requirement” enforced by a monetary “penalty.”   
The individual mandate crosses a fundamental line between limited 
constitutional government and limitless power cabined only by the vagaries of 
political will—which is to say, not cabined at all.  If the word “proper” is to be 
more than dead letter, it at least means that acts which destroy the very purpose of 
Article I—to enumerate and therefore limit the powers of Congress—are improper.  
If the federal power to enact “economic mandates” were upheld here, Congress 
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would be free to require anything of the citizenry so long as it was in the name of a 
comprehensive regulatory plan.  Unsupported by any fundamental, preexisting, or 
traditional duty of citizenship, imposing “economic mandates” on the people is 
improper, both in the lay and constitutional senses of that word.  Allowing 
Congress to exercise such power would turn “citizens” into “subjects.” 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the first time in American history, the federal government has attempted 
to “commandeer the people” by imposing on them an “economic mandate.”  Such 
economic mandates cannot be justified by existing Supreme Court doctrines 
defining and limiting the powers of Congress.  Upholding the power to impose 
economic mandates “would fundamentally alter the relationship of the federal 
government to the states and the people; nobody would ever again be able to claim 
plausibly that the Constitution limits federal power.”  Ilya Shapiro, State Suits 
Against Health Reform Are Well Grounded in Law—and Pose Serious Challenges, 
29 Health Affairs 1229, 1232 (June 2010).  It would turn citizens into subjects. 
As the district court recognized, “[n]ever before has the Commerce Clause 
and the associated Necessary and Proper Clause been extended this far.”  Virginia 
v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 612 (E.D. Va. 2010).  Only the Supreme Court is 
empowered to reconsider the outer bounds of federal power under the Commerce 
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and Necessary and Proper Clauses, and the district court properly interpreted the 
existing doctrinal limits in this area.  Accordingly, amici respectfully request this 
Court to uphold the district court. 
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